On Social Epistemology: Is There a Community of Knowledge?

INTRODUCTION

Modern epistemic models have shifted from John Locke’s individualistic claims that “the floating of other men’s opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing…” and that testimonial knowledge is “borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.”[i] Arguing against Locke’s claim that all men are an epistemic island, the majority of modern epistemologists now consider a social epistemology—where knowledge is a social accomplishment rather than an individual one. Since social epistemology is still a relatively young philosophical concept, epistemologists are still fine-tuning their epistemic models drawn from—as Michael Welbourne calls it—a community of knowledge.

This paper will examine in four parts the claim that knowledge is a social achievement by: accounting for the different ways of understanding the claim (part 1), explaining how the claim bears on the internalist and externalist conceptions of knowledge (part 2), presenting an argument for the claim (part 3), and discussing how Alvin Goldman’s Knowledge in a Social World offers additional support for the claim (part 4).

PART 1: THREE WAYS TO UNDERSTAND THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT

Imagine that a person, “A,” acquires knowledge, “K,” of a proposition, “p.” This acquisition of knowledge can be considered a social achievement in three ways—each focusing on a different property.

The first considers the acquisition itself as a social achievement. If K is to imply the standard definition of knowledge—that A is justified in believing p—then perhaps this justification depends on the epistemic states of A’s peers. For example, a member of the Flat-Earth Society might have been justified in her membership prior to 1492, while today’s commonplace knowledge that the Earth is not flat would make her membership in 2005 seem foolish.

The second considers A as being a social entity. For example, take the phrase, “The Detroit Pistons basketball team knows that defense wins championships.” Who holds the knowledge here? One view distributes the knowledge from the group to the individuals within; so each member of the Pistons would know that defense wins championships. Another view claims that no member of the group has individual knowledge of p, but the group as a social entity does. One way to look at this is that no individual member of the Pistons could win the championship (i.e.: to acquire Kp that defense wins championships) without being part of the team. We wouldn’t say Ben Wallace won the championship—the Pistons did. This non-distributive view is more controversial as I could just as easily say that the Detroit Pistons could not win the championship without the individual players. It would seem that we would need to distribute Kp to at least some of the members of the social entity.

The third considers the nature of Kp itself as a socially variable. While p can be easily seen to be socially constructed (consider a community of scientists presenting a hypothesis), the claim that the truth of p depends on social factors is more controversial. It is plausible to see that a community’s epistemic state can impact the justification of believing p, and that this community can also determine the contents of p—but the truth of p’s being dependent on social factors is much more controversial. Even if the member of the Flat-Earth Society was justified in her beliefs in 1491—the truth that the Earth is not flat is independent of our thoughts, beliefs, and social constructs.

PART 2: HOW THE CLAIM THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT BEARS ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

Looking at the first consideration in Part 1, we now have the social question: “How do the epistemic states of other people determine whether an individual is justified in believing a proposition (Bp)?” The internalist and externalist have different methods of answering this question.

The internalist would look for social reasons that would make a person, A, justified in Bp. Imagine A’s neighbor, N, was arrested for running moonshine. A would not be justified in believing that his neighbor is guilty as his judicial system states that all of his society’s members are innocent until proven guilty. After detectives round up the evidence against N and it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that N is guilty, A is now justified in his belief that N is guilty. The standard of evidence (beyond a reasonable doubt) and the burden of proof (innocent until proven guilty) with respect to N’s guilt are socially constructed factors that determine A’s justified beliefs that N is guilty. An internalist would use these factors as support for a socialist, internalist concept of knowledge.

The externalist, in contrast, would not look for social reasons for A to Bp, but will instead look for the social factors that determine A’s reliability in Bp. In other words, the externalist focuses at believing as a process in itself while the internalist focuses on the reasons to believe. Consider the act of Bp as an input/output model. Information is sent into the believer and the output is the belief of the proposition:

InfoàBELIEVERàBp

So if the info/input is that you heard on the local news that scientists have discovered that drinking wine can reduce the risk of heart disease, the believer processes this information into the belief that drinking wine reduces heart disease. An externalist would answer the social question by adding social factors that act upon the information, so our model will change to:

Social Factors~~>InfoàBELIEVERàBp

With the same information, consider social factors such as: it was a slow news day, a scientist needed some publicity for a grant renewal, or the scientist’s father works for a popular vineyard. Even if Bp doesn’t change, the reliability of the believer is now in question as his information may have been tainted by social pressures and influences. The externalist could use this model to show how social factors influence the reliability of the process of belief.

PART 3: AN ARGUMENT THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENT

In his Socializing Epistemology, Philip Kitcher presents his conception of a minimalist social epistemology. Before assessing Kitcher’s model, however, it is important to note that he uses the externalist conception of knowledge so we can anticipate the models of belief described in Part 2. Kitcher begins by presenting “the elements of a minimal social epistemology as follows:

(1) Individuals are the primary subjects of knowledge. To ascribe knowledge to a community is to make an assertion about the epistemic states of members of the community.

(2) X knows that p if and only if (a) X believes that p and (b) p and (c) X’s belief that p was formed by a reliable process.

(3) The reliability of the process that produces X’s belief that p depends on the properties and actions of agents other than X.”[ii]

Kitcher argues with his first element for a distributive model of knowledge within a social group. Thus, if the Detroit Pistons team knows that defense wins championships, then that knowledge is distributed to the individuals on the team. The second element offers an external definition of knowledge as it focuses on the process’s reliability. The third element of Kitcher’s minimal social epistemology argues that agents other than the believer (i.e.: social factors) determine the reliability of the belief process.

Now, to use this model to argue that knowledge is a social achievement, let us look at the third element with more depth. Kitcher claims that the reliability of our processes to acquire knowledge is dependent on actions and agents other than the believer. If this is true, then we can see how acquiring knowledge is dependent on social factors—thus making it a social achievement.

Imagine, first, that knowledge were completely individualized. How would we ever improve? Would we have to re-invent the wheel—literally? Thanks to Mr. Goodrich, back to the scientists who specialize in rubber, all the way back to prehistoric caveman who invented the wheel; I have new B.F. Goodrich tires on my car. If knowledge were completely individualized, I would have to start from scratch and carve a circle out of rock. Through the social nature of knowledge, we are able to build upon what our ancestors have learned. Since our processes of knowledge and belief are based on testimony and knowledge that have been built upon generations of other testimony and knowledge the integrity of the process itself depends on these sources. Imagine if the caveman thought a square would work better for a wheel, or if there is a better material suited for tires than rubber. Then, the social acceptance of rubber tires might actually hinder us from learning about this other, better material—thus making our belief process less reliable.

According to Kitcher’s definition of knowledge, if my belief in p is justified, if p is true, and my belief was formed by a reliable process, then I have knowledge of p. Since judging whether my process is reliable depends on social factors, we can now see how knowledge is a social accomplishment.

PART 4: GOLDMAN’S SUPPORT THAT KNOWLEDGE IS A SOCIAL ACCOMPLISHMENT

Using an externalist approach to judge whether knowledge is a social accomplishment, Alvin Goldman’s “Speech Regulation and the Marketplace of Ideas”[iii] studies whether social regulations on speech can affect the process in which we acquire knowledge. Goldman considers three forms of regulating A’s saying that p to B. The first regulates who A can be, or who can say that p (think of needing a license or degree to be a practicing psychologist). The second regulates what p can be (think of being required to be sworn in while testifying in court—p must be a true statement if one is to avoid severe punishment). The third regulates to whom p can be given (think of classified information or the rating system for movies).

Looking specifically at commercial speech, think of any of the packaged food products that you have recently purchased at the grocery store. The packaging is littered with testimony from the manufacturer: how many calories, the specific ingredients, claims that the package contains 25% more for the same price, etc. Most of the information printed on the package is a result of government regulation (FDA and FTC) on the speech of the seller. Additionally, most of what is not printed is a result of government regulation! Imagine the claims that the manufacturer could make without regulation—“Eating Wheaties clears acne in teens!” “Kemps Egg Nog is a proven cancer killer!” It would seem that these regulations ensure that we are given accurate information so we make more informed decisions when purchasing a product. These regulations also seem to protect us from being ‘taken’ by false information. Goldman adds that while these regulations may seem to promote a more functional system of free expression,

“I would say that they are largely aimed at inhibiting false statements (or something mandating true statements). Much of the FDA and FTC regulatory activity, for example, bans advertising or labeling that is false, deceptive, or misleading, where “deceptive” and “misleading” statements ore ones that lead people to draw false conclusions, even if the statements are not false in themselves… Careful control of such speech holds out a strong promise of veritistic [i.e.: truth-bearing] gain.”[iv]

Whether or not government regulation on speech actually improves our system of acquiring knowledge (rather than leaving it up to a “free market of ideas”) is open for an argument that Goldman does provide in his writing. The fact that the regulation does exist and it does affect the process in which we gain knowledge should be enough to support the claim that knowledge is a social accomplishment according to the externalist point of view.

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[i] John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, I iii 24

[ii] p. 113, Phillip Kitcher, Socializing Epistemology, ed, Fredrick F. Schmitt, Rowman & Littlefield, 1994

[iii] Chapter 7 from Alvin Goldman’s Knowledge in a Social World, pp 189-217, Oxford University Press, 1994

[iv] Goldman, p. 206-7.